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The study of totalitarian states and systems has been an extremely varied and interesting process. The sheer multitude of factors that make up a totalitarian system is enormous. Every aspect of a “normal” state can be found in a totalitarian state, like economic, political, cultural and environmental factors. But there are also factors unique to totalitarian states, for instance a highly centralized government, often a dictator and his party, a dominant ideology and a strong emphasis on military might and internal security forces. However, as Francis Fukuyama highlights, the main characteristic of a totalitarian system is the pervasive wish to dominate every aspect of life.
Since the earliest ages of civilization there have been numerous dictators and tyrants. Powerful, aggressive, deranged or sadistic rulers like Herod, Nero or Dzengis Khan struck fear in the hearts of their subjects for generations. Often these men ruled with an iron fist, depending on armed forces and terror to keep them in place. They squeezed their subjects for taxes and services, and responded with extreme violence when they encountered opposition.
Hitler and Stalin were not like these rulers. According to Alex Inkeles “the difference between the action of the modern totalitarian and that of earlier seekers after power is [...] lying in the thoroughness and effectiveness of the technical means of control both necessary to and possible for the ruler of a modern industrial society.”​[2]​ Though this is true, I would like to add to this statement that another main difference lies in the extraordinary mobilization of society that characterizes totalitarianism. Earlier tyrants often were not really interested whether they were popular or not, at least not in the way Hitler and Stalin were. They mobilized the masses in a way that was unheard of before the twentieth century.
The term totalitarianism first came into use in the 1920’s, although for some time totalitarianism was mistaken for super-absolutism. Lots of books and articles have been written in which Hitler and Stalin were portrayed as all-knowing, all-powerful masters, with their claws firmly in every nook and cranny of society. Deutscher and Bullock, amongst others, have written works from this point of view. In their works Stalin and Hitler almost resembled evil geniuses from early James Bond-films, plotting in their bunkers and laughing eerily whenever one of their devilish plans to control the population came into effect. Their ever-present secret policemen behaved like myrmidons, doing whatever their masters told them to do. 
The policemen in these books were considered to be constantly on the lookout for subversive actions or malignant gossip, and woe to the unlucky person who fell into their hands. Their victims awaited jail, torture and execution. The hapless population was considered to be at the mercy of their dictatorial masters.​[3]​  A good example of this classic depiction of totalitarianism is 1984, the famous novel by George Orwell. The main character, Winston Smith, experiences the wrath of a (fictional) totalitarian system, completely confirming this image of the all-powerful system and the powerless individual: Big Brother is watching his every move, listening in on his every word and eventually controlling him completely. 
So the subjects of a dictator were considered to be at the mercy of the “invisible author, manager and producer”, unable to change their lot, continuously subjected to bullying to make sure they dared not speak up.​[4]​ Terrorizing the nation seemed to be the dictators’ only way to gain and stay in power. And, according to his archenemy Leon Trotsky, Stalin used these same methods against his closest comrades; in effect becoming the single culprit behind all that was to befall the entire Soviet Union.​[5]​ In short, these studies mainly saw the dictator and his henchmen as active culprits, while the overall population was depicted as a scared mass of passive victims.
However since the 1970’s the study of totalitarian states has experienced a shift of focus.​[6]​ History stopped being the realm of science that simply studied “big men doing big things”. The sociological, feminist and Marxist influences on historians made them more interested in “ordinary” people and everyday life. The twentieth century was recognized as a century “in which the masses came onto the stage of history as active participants in events.”​[7]​ Where the focus used to be on the leaders, these people all too often tended to be forgotten or, as mentioned above, were depicted as mere victims. More recent studies have painted a rather different and more varied picture. From this newer point of view, Hitler and Stalin did not come into power simply by terror or violence. They came into power because a large part of the citizens in their respective countries wanted them in power. Hitler and Stalin did not need to constantly threaten or coerce their populations, nor could they. These popular dictators also had to rely “on compromise and consensus on the part of the civilian population, and they had to be respectful of popular opinion and willing to negotiate. That they did these things helps to account for their popularity.”​[8]​ 
Their subjects obeyed them not just out of fear of the consequences if they did not; but rather because they saw their interests safeguarded by the new regime. Lots of ordinary Germans and Russians wanted to be thought of as loyal citizens, and acted accordingly. The USSR and the Third Reich nowadays are seen more as “’self-policing’ state[s] operating within a ‘consensus-dictatorship’.”​[9]​ The focus of investigation has therefore come to be more on this mobilized society, the ordinary people, and on the ways they responded to dictatorship. Authors like Orlando Figes, Richard Overy, Ian Kershaw and Robert Gellately have painted colorful pictures of everyday people living their lives under the most murderous regimes of the twentieth century. These authors have demonstrated that a lot of the people formerly described as passive subjects were actually active participants in totalitarian society.
So over the years it has become clear that totalitarian regimes needed their subjects. Totalitarian regimes were not like Hobbes’s Leviathan. Arguably, the dictators did not even steer events to the extent as they were steered by events. Hitler and Stalin had to respond to demands from society to stay in power. In this aspect they are of course not alone; every government needs a population willing to be governed. To put the matter in extreme terms: a state can not exist without its population, and a society does not function without the consent of the majority of its population. Therefore every population decides to some degree by whom it is governed and in what way. This would of course be too easy an explanation, since it completely ignores factors like tradition, culture or religion. It also does not appreciate the effects of terror that a regime might use to coerce its population into obedience. However the persons involved in this terror are drawn from the same population that is being terrorized. So in dictatorial societies there had to be at least a hard core of active believers (or mindless criminals) to do the regimes dirty work. But this hard core would be a tiny minority, which the majority could easily overthrow if it wanted to. So there had to be other, larger groups with an interest in sustaining the status quo. As Richard Overy put it: “If repression is to work, a substantial section of society must identify with or even approve its activities.”​[10]​ And as Karl Deutsch has stated: “[…every] government must be to a considerable extent accessible and predictable. It must be accessible to the questions, problems, needs, desires and communications of it’s subjects; it’s office must be accessible to personnel recruited from their ranks; the minds of it’s decision-makers must remain open to the hopes, fears and wishes of it’s population.” ​[11]​
When a democratically chosen person loses an election, he or she retires. When a dictator loses support, he runs a great risk of losing a lot more. In this way Hitler and Stalin needed their subjects even more than their subjects needed the regime. Though both violent and utterly dictatorial, Stalin and Hitler thus had to be overall supported by a significant part of their populations. I will return to this theme in the chapter that deals with the two systems. 
From 1933 to 1945 the Nazi party controlled the German people through various security organizations, but primarily through the Gestapo (an abbreviation of Geheime Staatspolizei). During the same period the people of the Soviet Union were under scrutiny of the NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, translated in English as the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), the secret police force of the communist party.
Recent literature has shown that the NKVD and the Gestapo, bone chilling as their reputations may be, could not operate without the steady flow of information from the population. Orlando Figes’ groundbreaking book The Whisperers shows the common people as the eyes and ears of the Soviet-regime. The continuous stream of political prisoners that filled the Gulag may have been ordered from the top of the system, but was enabled and enforced from the bottom. Ordinary people not only informed on others, they helped state-officials with law enforcement in various other ways as well.




This thesis will examine the ways the regimes of the USSR under Stalin and Germany under Hitler used their political police forces to control the population. I have chosen to limit my subject to the period 1934-1945, following Richard Overy in his conclusions that by 1934 Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin both were the undisputed leaders of their countries.​[12]​ Geographically, I will limit my subject to the internal situation of both states, in so far as possible. After all, during World war Two the borders of the respective countries were not quite stationary.
Since it has been sufficiently demonstrated that citizens were a vital part in law-enforcement, this thesis will also try to shed some light on the reasons and motivations people had to cooperate with the authorities. It will deal with the question why the population was willing and sometimes eager to help the state fight its real or imagined enemies. The emphasis in this thesis will be on the interaction between the political police forces and the population. The main question will be: how did political police forces help enforce the totalitarian nature of these states?
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Table 1: Schematic impression of the comparison
As mentioned above, I will also examine the question whether it was mainly consent or coercion that made people betray their neighbors, friends or even kin. Since it is nearly impossible to examine inner convictions or beliefs, I will examine the reasons people gave themselves (in so far as these have been recorded). A number of cases will be touched upon in which people cooperated with the secret services of Nazi-Germany or the USSR. The examining of these cases will focus on such questions as: Why did ordinary citizens help in enforcing the repressive policies? How did they help? Were the collaborators social misfits seeking revenge against their superiors? And were there differences between what happened with those arrested by the NKVD and the Gestapo? A secondary goal of this method is to find out whether there were significant differences between the willingness of the two populations to cooperate.
The importance of examining these aspects of totalitarian regimes may not seem evident. The days of the NKVD and the Gestapo are, thankfully, long gone. Denouncers and victims are in their eighties and nineties, if not already dead. But for our own understanding of the functioning of totalitarian regimes it is of the utmost importance to know why people were willing to help the authorities. It is equally important to understand how these police-apparatuses assisted the regimes in sustaining the level of control generated by a totalitarian regime. Since these police forces did not operate in a vacuum, I will concisely describe the totalitarian systems and their dictators to provide the necessary background.
Of course both totalitarian systems evolved and changed over the period under investigation. Likewise, the manner and intensity of state-repression differed greatly over this eleven-year period. Both regimes knew periods of relative relaxation and periods of high tension. The Gestapo and the NKVD also changed over time. These developments made the actual situation more differentiated than can be described in this thesis. However throughout the period under investigation both systems were arresting, deporting and killing innocent people on a massive scale. And during this period the populations of the USSR and Nazi-Germany were actively or passively assisting the repressive police forces of their respective states. A final chapter will deal with the victims of both regimes, as a necessary illustration of the results of this cooperation between law-enforcers and citizens.

The comparative method 

Why should we compare historic events and phenomena? What can a comparison add to our knowledge and understanding of the past? Isn't every historic event unique? And if it is unique (and thus it’s not going to occur again) what can we learn from it?
Perhaps some of this critique is true. However history is a science that studies people and the way people act in certain situations. Psychological and sociological studies have shown that most people act likewise in comparable situations. There are of course exceptions, but as a rule human beings prefer not to experience physical pain or mental anguish. A person who is hungry will try to find food, a person who is cold will seek warmth and a person who is grieving will seek comfort. These same rules apply to groups of people. For example, there are no cultures in which a shortage of food is considered positive. There are no cultures in which childbirth (within marriage) is seen as negative. In practically every society the dead are mourned, the birth of new life is celebrated and people work in order to improve their lot. So we can state that people live and act according to patterns. These patterns can be recognized and studied. The comparison between two groups of people or historical events serves as a way to recognize these patterns.
So when we compare the French Revolution with the Russian Revolution it is not to prove that they are the same, or to prove that they are different. It is a way to get insight in the patterns of human behavior and why these can sometimes lead to revolutions. And when we have concluded why these revolutions may have occurred, we can compare these findings to other events with comparable situations in which there was no revolution. 
So is it possible to come to a meaningful comparison between Nazi Germany and the USSR under Stalin? The answer is: Yes, because both states were totalitarian. But, one might ask, as Carl J. Friedrich has done:  “why do we say that fascist and communist totalitarian society are basically alike? For it is obvious that they are not alike in intention. The sharply divergent content of their ideologies proves it.”​[13]​ His answer to this question is not as straightforward as one might hope, however it is equally unavoidable: “In the first instance, the qualifying adverb “basically” is intended to indicate that they are not wholly alike.”​[14]​  All right, one might think, but then in what ways were they alike? Friedrich answers this question by giving us “five closely linked clusters of characteristic features.” of totalitarian states.​[15]​ Totalitarian states, according to him, all have:
An official ideology covering all vital aspects of man's existence.
A single mass party dedicated to this ideology.
A (near-complete) monopoly of control of all armed forces.
A (near-complete) monopoly of all modes of mass-communication.
A system of (terroristic) police control directed not only against demonstrable enemies of the regime but also against groups of people deemed undesirable.​[16]​
(A sixth characteristic feature of a totalitarian system was later added: a centralized bureaucratic management of the economy.​[17]​) 
Nazi Germany and the USSR under Stalin both had these features; thus they were both totalitarian, thus they can be compared. However, in his book The dictators, Richard Overy starts his introduction by asking the equally important question whether the dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin should be compared, meaning whether it would help us understand more if we would compare. I would like to quote his answer, as I consider it to be the guiding thought that made me want to write about this subject: “The historians responsibility is [...] to try to understand the differing historical processes and states of mind that led both these dictatorships to murder on such a colossal scale.”​[18]​
I for one do not believe that historians can create mathematical equations that can capture historical reality in all its aspects. But we can create scientific frameworks in which we can compare events and thus expand our knowledge. And, quoting Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, “once this is admitted, we can theorize; and we can and should compare​[19]​. Of course all events are to some point unique; however this does not have to make them incomparable. In fact, it is self-evident that only comparison allows an understanding of uniqueness.”​[20]​ This understanding in my view exists of more than just historical facts. Rather it is knowledge of the functioning of the human race. My objective is to find out how political police forces functioned in totalitarian regimes. I also hope to gain insight in why people would betray their friends, neighbors, relatives and others to murderous and utterly immoral regimes. To get to the heart of the matter I felt it necessary to start the comparison on a grand scale, the scale of the dictators and their systems, and from there on focus on the smaller aspects of political police forces, denouncers and victims. To keep these subjects within bounds I decided to use most recent literature wherever possible. However, in order not to get bogged down in details, I sometimes have had to generalize. By comparing the functioning of both police apparatuses as well as the reasons for denouncing others I hope to expand the knowledge and understanding of totalitarian regimes. 
Two dictators
Hitler and Stalin were arguably the two most influential men of the twentieth century. Together with the Chinese Communist Party’s Chairman Mao one might call them the big three, rated by the numbers of victims, political impact and disruption of society they caused.​[21]​ I will not go into detail on the lives of Hitler or Stalin, since many distinguished scholars, for instance Ian Kershaw, Richard Overy and Simon Sebag Montefiore, have abundantly described these. I will however highlight the way both dictators came into power and portray the main characteristics of their personalities.
Adolf Hitler was a popular leader. Ian Kershaw states that Adolf Hitler was chosen by a considerable part of the German people, approximately forty percent.​[22]​ The ideology of the NSDAP appealed to many Germans, with its emphasis on nationalism, militarism and racial purity. Crisis ridden Germany in the twenties and thirties was a fertile soil for extreme political views, both left and right wing, and the NSDAP was by no means unique in its political program. It was however a highly disciplined and militant organization, made up of men who were convinced of the justness of their cause.  Adolf Hitler soon presented himself as the party’s main speaker. His extraordinary skills in speaking to crowds, his almost hypnotic way of connecting with people and his eccentric persona won the NSDAP massive attention and, gradually, popular support.​[23]​ For many Germans Hitler was not just a politician, he was the leader they were willing to follow. He presented himself as a symbol of national renewal and hope. A good part of the German people believed in Hitler in an almost religious fashion. And Hitler reciprocated by allowing them to worship him. According to Richard Overy, he deliberately presented himself as savior, as the one who knew what to do to restore Germany.​[24]​ 
However Hitler was not just an ordinary madman with a Caesar-complex. He did not just say he would bring Germany back to the top militarily; he did in fact do it. He did not only promise more jobs and economic prosperity, he also accomplished to revive the economy. Hitler created a massive industrial complex (mainly for rearmament), a high-tech infrastructure, millions of jobs and a strong national currency. According to Ian Kershaw he instilled in millions of Germans a sense of pride that had been lost in World War I and the ensuing national chaos.​[25]​ In short, he was popular and many Germans absolutely believed he was the best thing that had happened to them in a long time. A lot of Germans happily gave up their civil rights to be part of the new Reich. To quote Overy: “The result [of this belief in national renewal] was a widespread and willing political abdication, evident even among social or political groups previously hostile to the new regime.”​[26]​ Not until the first bombs began falling on German soil was there much more than privately expressed doubt about Hitler’s genius.
Stalin’s way to power was different. Hitler had started with a small, fanatical movement which through, amongst other factors, his personal popularity had acquired political power. Stalin stood in a long tradition of extreme left wing terrorists.​[27]​ Marxism, anarchism and socialism all were widespread political forces before Stalin was even born. When Stalin joined the Bolshevik Party he was by no means a founding member. However he was a devoted disciple of Marx and Lenin from the beginning. During the Russian Revolution, and the ensuing civil war, Stalin played significant roles. He was one of Lenin’s troubleshooters, sent to problem areas to play the part of communist inquisitor and military commander.​[28]​ The public knew who he was, however he never managed to acquire a status equal to Lenin (or Trotsky). According to Montefiore, this suspicious, violent, “natural radical” could not be satisfied with playing second violin.​[29]​ When Lenin died, Stalin acted. In the Soviet Union of the 1920’s there was a lot of popular discontent. The New Economic Policy, or NEP, had produced a new class of cobblers and traders, while most Russians were dirt-poor. For the majority of Bolshevik old fighters and ordinary Russians these so-called NEP-men symbolized a new oppressive class, who allegedly exploited the proletarians through high prices.​[30]​ They flaunted their newfound wealth and were hated by a good part of Soviet society.​[31]​ While some Soviet leaders, like Bukharin, wanted to maintain a minor market economy, Stalin was convinced that the NEP destroyed the Revolution.​[32]​ Mobilizing the popular feelings of discontent, he came down hard on all opposition.​[33]​ Montefiore describes how he outmaneuvered, convinced or destroyed any opposition their might have been, forming various alliances only to turn on his comrades when he did not need them anymore.​[34]​ In what is often called “a revolution from above”, Stalin got rid of obstinate or politically unreliable party-members.​[35]​ According to Suny, Stalin proved to many Soviet citizens that their interests were safe with him: “Peasants who became workers and workers who became managers and party bosses were moving up, while many of their envied social ‘betters’ of the past were experiencing an enforced downward mobility.”​[36]​ Stalin’s former colleague and now personal archenemy, Leon Trotsky, was forced to live in exile.
For many Soviet citizens Stalin symbolized the real Soviet ‘boss’.​[37]​ He was harsh and crude, perhaps, but he understood the needs of the people. Also, he simplified Communist ideology, and “consistently emphasized optimism, hope and even faith”.​[38]​ This “ultimate man of the machine”​[39]​ demonstrated to a majority of citizens that he was the infallible leader, the one person who could and would protect the Soviet Union. 
Stalin and Hitler, though coming into power in different ways, had some common characteristics. They did not resemble the tyrants of earlier ages, they were something new; the popular dictator.​[40]​ They were not known by long winding titles, which might reek of aristocratic pretensions, but were referred to simply as the leader or the boss, the Fuehrer or the Vohzd.​[41]​ Stalin was proud of his humble and rough background, which gave him the necessary proletarian credential. Hitler prided himself on having fought and suffered in the First World War, amongst millions of other ordinary fellows. Both men were not only violent; they thought it necessary to show that they were violent. At the same time Hitler and Stalin actively worked on portraying themselves as saviors or fathers of their people, “all-seeing, all-knowing, […] good shepherds, tenderly caring for their flocks, vigilant in their defense against the wolves who might otherwise devour them”.​[42]​ They had a hard core of fanatical followers (and a large group of less fiery supporters or opportunistic enthusiasts) around them. They were shown not as forced upon the people, but as chosen from the people. Hitler was portrayed as Germany’s redeemer, a Christ-like warrior who would save the German race.​[43]​ Stalin was portrayed as the one person who was able to foresee the course of the Revolution, the one also who could and would safeguard the people of the USSR and the heritage of the Revolution. 




Over the years there has been much debate about whether Hitler and Stalin were ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ dictators. These arguments revolved mainly around the question whether they “made things happen” or rather were steered by events themselves. In my opinion both views are true. When a situation occurred, both dictators could not simply act without considering consequences. They would have to act according to “political necessity”, i.e. do that which kept them in power. To stay in power they would have to align themselves with a strong group. For instance, Stalin could instigate the collectivization of the countryside only if there was some sort of demand from society for this kind of policy. If he would not do what at least one part of society demanded, he would lose his power. So Stalin had to align himself with a ‘faction’, a group in society who wanted the same thing, in this instance city-dwellers. However he was the only one who could give such an order, so this “faction” needed him as well. 
For Hitler this switching of allegiance was also necessary to stay in power. He sometimes aligned himself with the conservatives, as he did in the Church struggle​[47]​, and sometimes with the radicals, for instance in the Kristallnacht​[48]​. Thus both dictators were at the same time the main actors in their realms, yet they had to keep close watch of the wishes and interests of the groups that kept them in power. People needed the dictator as long as he could fulfill at least a part of their needs. So Stalin and Hitler, in my view, both were strong considering the fact that nothing could be done without their consent, yet weak in the fact that they had to be receptive to demands from society.
Apart from this interaction, Stalin and Hitler ruled their empires in rather different ways. Hitler’s power appears to have depended mostly on his popularity and the personal commitment people felt towards him. A lot of his followers were absolutely devoted to this extraordinary man. His top men, for instance Goering, Himmler, and Goebbels, all felt a deep personal loyalty to Hitler.​[49]​ Stalin was not such an extraordinary, mesmerizing personality, especially not when compared to his great predecessor Lenin. He ruled primarily through what Hans Ulrich Wehler (quoted in Lewin) has dubbed “negative inspiration”, the creation of enemies.​[50]​ Stalin kept the Soviet Union in a constant fear of war, first with capitalists, then with “enemies of the people”. In this continuous war scare his associates had to prove the impossible; they had to show that they were not enemies. In this situation, the only one who could never be an enemy was Stalin himself. The desire to prove that they were loyal to Marxism and thus to Stalin kept his personal entourage on their toes. They admired him, yet feared him even more. For the ordinary Soviet citizen, who did not know all facts, he often appeared as the one man who would go to any length to safeguard the Soviet Union from whomever. When famous Bolsheviks like Zinoviev and Kamenev were tried and executed, the majority of the Soviet people believed that they had actually been ‘enemies of the people’. Why else would Stalin destroy them? 
When it came to everyday governing the dictators were different as well. While Hitler often seemed not very interested in the details of government, Stalin could be a terrible nitpicker. However, it is important not to exaggerate this. Kershaw states that Hitler simply could not afford to be seen meddling in everyday politics and squabbling party members, since he had to embody the unity of the Reich.​[51]​ Hitler often did not issue direct orders but held monologues, after which he left the execution of his wishes up to his local underlings.​[52]​ Ian Kershaw describes the way in which Nazi-Germany was governed as “working towards the Fuehrer”, which meant that local leaders were pretty much left to do as they thought Hitler would want it.​[53]​ Of course this style of government allowed for an enormous variety of interpretations. Some historians have named this method of ruling Neo-feudalism, since every viceroy could rule in his own fief. 
In Stalin’s realm this was all but impossible. The gigantic bureaucracy of the Soviet Union presented him constantly with all facts and figures deemed important. Of course no man could handle all this paperwork by himself, so his close colleagues in the Politburo were all assigned to certain areas of expertise. But managers and directors in heavy industry or agriculture could rest assure that their activities would be closely monitored by Stalin himself. However, in this case too it is important not to portray Stalin simply as a workaholic. He could work hard, yet only when it suited him. Naturally Hitler also had areas that interested him very much. When it came to architecture or military affairs he followed the developments with great scrutiny, considering himself the supreme judge in these fields. Langer quotes Hitler saying: “I do not play at war. I do not allow the “generals” to give me orders. The war is conducted by me. The precise moment to attack will be determined by me.”​[54]​ 
During the 1930’s there were only two nations in which it was normal for the government to persecute, arrest and deport thousands of people who in most other societies would be considered innocent. Both systems actively repressed the groups they considered to be undesirable. Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, prostitutes, Negroes, Slavs, communists and socialists were discriminated against in Germany, singled out to be removed from society at one time or another. Former Tsarist officers and bureaucrats, priests, merchants, Kulaks (“rich” peasants), nobility and “anti-socials” were singled out for abuse in the Soviet-Union. Anyone who did not fit in the racially pure or socially just society apparently deserved a terrible faith in the concentration camps, gas chambers or mass graves. Certain groups were simply pointed out as enemies, with whom no consideration whatsoever was necessary or even appropriate. And this was combined with an enormous effort both regimes put into stifling dissent and neutralizing opposition. The regimes had two ways to achieve these goals; positive and negative. The positive “pull-factors” were mainly propaganda, material rewards for “good” citizens and entertainment. There were lots of military parades, carnivals and organized trips for people to enjoy in the Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany. Massive amounts of citizens, who were not considered “enemies”, were involved in various committees, communities and organizations, all of course state controlled. The totalitarian state took good care of its citizens, providing education, sport and leisure activities, jobs, housing and health care. To quote Eric Johnson, “the social control functions of the Nazi party may even have outstripped that of the police and the courts.”​[55]​
The negative, push-factors were coercion, violence and isolation. People who did not fit the social or racial norms were considered dangerous outcasts. Jews were not to be treated friendly, or even normal, in Nazi Germany, as were “enemies of the people” in the Soviet Union. A decent person should not want to associate with those people, let alone befriend them. And if these norms were broken, Nazi-Germany and the USSR both had a legal system that provided a judicial base for taking the necessary measures. 

The organization of the NKVD and the Gestapo

The Gestapo and NKVD were the main repressive organs of Nazi Germany and the SU respectively. They differed in many ways, yet closely resembled each other in other aspects. One important difference was the way both organizations came into existence. The NKVD, like all Soviet institutions, was a product of the Russian Revolution. The Gestapo, on the other hand, was more a continuation of political police forces that had existed in Germany since 1870. A lot of political policemen who had worked for the Weimar-republic continued their work under Hitler, contrary to the popular belief that there was a “wholesale expulsion of the old custodians in favor of Nazi Party members.”​[56]​ There certainly were non-Nazi's in the Gestapo-ranks, although Gellately demonstrates that their number diminished over the years.​[57]​ There were no (openly) non-communists in the NKVD. This was an institution completely set up by and devoted to the Communist Party. NKVD-men were the true vanguard of the party, “real Communists and true Revolutionaries”; at least that is how many of them saw themselves.​[58]​ Of course there had existed a political police force in Russia before the Revolution of 1917, the Okhrana, but this organization resembled the NKVD neither in expertise nor in ferocity.​[59]​ Its members were amongst the first victims of the Revolution, as most common people hated these Tsarist agents.
A feature both Gestapo and NKVD shared was the fact that they actually consisted of various organizations. What is called the Gestapo was in fact a conglomerate of various political police forces. Germany consisted of Länder, areas with varying levels of autonomy. Different areas had local governments and local police forces. For instance, the Geheime Staatspolizei operated in Prussia, while the Bayerische Politischen Polizei controlled Bavaria.​[60]​ Other areas had similar organizations. The Gestapo was primarily an interior security-force, only secondarily employed abroad. The Sicherheitsdienst or SD was the intelligence apparatus of the SS. This notorious organization had started out as Hitler’s personal guard, but under Himmler was to grow into a formidable army and bureaucracy with control over the concentration camps. Initially the Prussian branch of the Gestapo fell under Hermann Goering, but in 1934 he ceded this organization to Heinrich Himmler.​[61]​ Himmler’s close associate Reinhard Heydrich had founded the Sicherheitsdienst as the security organization of the SS.​[62]​ These services after 1939 all fell under the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA.​[63]​ Himmler and Heydrich controlled the RSHA, which thus contained the SS, the SD, Abwehr, the Sipo, Kripo and Gestapo and various other law-enforcement agencies. To be more precise, the RSHA as a hole fell under Heinrich Himmler while the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst were the domain of Reinhard Heydrich, until his assassination in 1942. The Abwehr, the intelligence agency of the Wehrmacht, was primarily involved with gathering military intelligence and counterespionage in foreign countries and occupied territories.​[64]​ The Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) and the Kriminalpolizei (Kripo) were also different organizations; however there seems to have been some overlap. As the SS grew more and more powerful it began to resemble a state within a state, or rather a parallel state with its own agencies mirroring the state organizations. However there was much, sometimes even violent, friction between these services.​[65]​ On the whole, there were no clear-cut boundaries between their fields of operation.​[66]​ The police forces dedicated to keeping everyday civil order were concentrated in the Orpo​[67]​, or Ordnungspolizei, containing the Gemeindepolizei, Schutzpolizei, Gendarmerie and Verkehrspolizei.​[68]​
The Gestapo itself for most part was under control of professional policemen. Its first top man was Rudolf Diels, a protégé of Goering. When the Gestapo was placed under supervision of Himmler in 1934 Heinrich Müller replaced him.​[69]​ Müller was not a Nazi but rather an ambitious career maker. He led the Gestapo until Soviet forces took Berlin in 1945. The SD in this period was led by Walter Schellenberg, who referred to the simultaneous functioning of all these security apparatuses with the understatement “a tremendous administrative problem”.​[70]​ The situation was probably not unlike the present-day United States, which has different police forces per state and interstate forces like the FBI, ATF, DEA and so forth. To quote Claire Hall: “The Gestapo was just one among many repressive Nazi institutions that ruthlessly policed Germany.”​[71]​
The NKVD, or People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, was an umbrella-organization, consisting of border guards, political policemen, concentration camp guards and even firemen. It was variously known as the Cheka, the OGPU, the GPU and SMERSH in little over twenty years.​[72]​ The NKVD not only kept close watch of Soviet society, but it also controlled the Party itself, thereby in effect becoming the main weapon of as well as the main threat to the Party-members. And to make the situation even more schizophrenic, the NKVD also kept close watch on its own personnel and leadership. Small wonder this institute went through many changes of top men. From the 1920’s to the 1950’s Felix Dzerzhinsky, Genrikh Yagoda, Nicolai Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria led it, in chronological order.​[73]​  Only one of these leaders (Felix Dzerzhinsky) died a natural death, since gradually one after another came under suspicion of their own organization.​[74]​ Another factor that contributed to this cannibalistic environment was the fact that each NKVD-boss took his own entourage with him into the organization. When the boss fell, all his cronies fell with him. Stalin often used one group to dispose of another; the group of Yezhov destroyed Yagoda’s cronies, and Beria’s gang decimated Yezhov’s entourage. Stalin also tried to curb the power of his underlings by cutting into their realm; in 1941 he divided the NKVD in the NKVD, under Beria, and the NKGB under Merkulov.​[75]​ For war purposes, he also created a military intelligence unit, the GRU, and a counter-espionage department, known as SMERSH.​[76]​ According to Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl, these services were bitter rivals.​[77]​ During 1935 NKVD-officials received a military rank, the highest Commissar of State security getting on equal foot with Marshals.​[78]​ The NKVD was heavily involved with the military, as political commissars were a standard part of every military unit. These officers were not interested in boosting morale, but rather they were there to “isolate and identify anti-communists and counterrevolutionaries.”​[79]​
The NKVD also operated outside the Soviet Union. NKVD-officials spread the gospel of communism across the globe in the 1920’s and 1930’s. They were active all over Europe, especially in Spain during the civil war.​[80]​ The NKVD provided the Spanish government with weapons and training against Franco’s fascists, while at the same time killing Trotskyists and other malcontents.​[81]​ In another main operating theatre, China, the NKVD first supported Chiang Kai Chek against the Japanese, and then the communists under Mao Zedong against Chiang’s nationalists.​[82]​
During the cold war the organization would be known throughout the Western world as the KGB. As not to confuse the reader I will consistently use the term NKVD in this article. As mentioned earlier, I will however not include the NKVD’s foreign operations in this thesis.  
It is important for the understanding of the immense power the RSHA and the NKVD held to note that these organizations both were or became independent ministries. These organizations, which had all the necessary tools to arrest, try, convict, imprison and execute (almost) any person, were not subjugated to any other institution, save for their direct bosses and of course the dictators themselves. 
So how many people worked in these police forces? Much less than one might expect from organizations with such a fearsome reputation. The Gestapo at its highpoint probably had no more than 32,000 personnel, according to Gellately​[83]​, while Overy even diminishes that number to 20,000​[84]​. This tiny organization had to administer approximately 68 million people. The Nuremberg Gestapo, for example, totaled 150 people while having to administer 2,771,720 people spread over an area of 14,115 square kilometers.​[85]​ This would have meant that there was one Gestapo-official per 18,478 citizens. However, according to Claire Hall we should add another 100 paid informers to this number of agents, altering the calculation to one Gestapo-employee per 11,000 citizens.​[86]​ 
The NKVD was larger; Overy puts their number at 366,000 personnel, yet these were mostly border guards, regular policemen and even firemen.​[87]​ The NKVD-men whose primary task was the rooting out of opposition (who were commonly known as Chekists​[88]​) made up a rather small part of the NKVD as a whole.​[89]​ On an entire population of almost 200 million people, their number was almost negligible. For instance, the three million citizens of Leningrad were under scrutiny of just thirty (!) political policemen.​[90]​ Both political police apparatuses were thus rather small, especially considering the fact that at least some of the employees will not have been active as field agents but rather as administrative staff members. 
An important difference between both services was a direct result of the different styles of ruling of Hitler and Stalin. Stalin closely watched every move of his NKVD, while Hitler had more of a laissez-faire attitude. Stalin knew that a person who controlled the NKVD could become more powerful than himself, if given the chance. This he could not allow, so he always made sure to have enough incriminating evidence on the person in charge. Should this person become a threat, Stalin could quite easily have him purged. And in case excesses were committed by the NKVD Stalin could blame its former leadership and wash his own hands of all responsibility, something he did regularly. With this sword of Damocles dangling above ones head, being head of the NKVD was a mixed blessing at best. The leaders of the NKVD were amongst the first victims of the 1936-1938 Terror.​[91]​ Hitler, on the other hand, appears to have trusted Himmler and Heydrich enough to entrust his own personal safety to the services they controlled. There were no purges of the German security-organizations until after the attempt on Hitler’s life in 1944. 
The NKVD and the Gestapo both were the product of the need the two regimes felt to terrorize their opponents. In this they were not just instruments of law enforcement; they were allowed to make decisions as to whether or not something was illegal regardless of the law. Hermann Goering made this absolutely clear by saying that: “The primary thing is not the formal law but the race; law and the life of the race are not to be separated from each other.” ​[92]​ According to Overy “one of the RSHA’s first acts was to issue guidelines to allow the Gestapo to take anyone guilty of weakening the war effort into custody and to execute them, or send them to a camp, without reference to the courts”.​[93]​
Felix Dzerzhinsky, the first head of the Cheka, the forerunner of the NKVD, stated: “We exist on a basis of organized terror, which is an absolutely essential element in revolution. We counter the enemies of the Soviet government with terror and extirpate the criminals on the spot…The Cheka is not a court of justice. It is a defender of the Revolution, just like the Red Army. And just as the Red Army in the civil war cannot stop to see whether it is wronging individuals, and is obliged to pursue a single aim, i.e. the victory of the Revolution over the bourgeoisie - in the same way the Cheka is obliged to defend the Revolution and crush the enemy, even if its sword sometimes chances to strike the heads of innocent people.” ​[94]​ 
As mentioned before, the Gestapo was purely a political police force while the NKVD had far more tasks. The Soviet Union had one organization for the same tasks where Nazi Germany employed different agencies. For instance, the NKVD also managed the enormous Gulag-labor camps conglomerate.​[95]​ The Gestapo did not control any major concentration camps, which were under the supervision of the SS. The Gestapo did however create some camps for recalcitrant workers, where people would be put for short periods of “re-education” through forced labor.​[96]​  
In some respects the NKVD and the Gestapo were very much alike. For instance, they both had a separate branch to control religious groups; the Gestapo had its “churches, sects and Freemasons” section, while the NKVD employed a “division for religious affairs”.​[97]​
The two organizations worked in close collaboration with the military, the police and other government services. The NKVD often recruited local militia, often Komsomol-members, to assist in major operations, as with the actions against the Kulaks in 1935-1936. The Gestapo was often assisted by local police-, army- or SA-units. 

The methods of the NKVD and the Gestapo

How did the Gestapo and NKVD operate? How did these organizations maintain their grip on society, and how firm was this grip? Judging by the figures alone one could easily be led to conclude that the organizations were completely understaffed and therefore unable to control anything other than their own paperwork. However neither the NKVD nor the Gestapo operated in a vacuum. They operated in a society which overall considered them either as useful and important agencies or as necessary evils. Both organizations relied heavily on a network of informers and denouncers. These networks were quite extensive. Orlando Figes estimates the number of informers in the Soviet-Union at approximately one in every four hundred inhabitants.​[98]​ The number of paid informers in Nazi-Germany is estimated at one per every Gestapo-official.​[99]​ So in the Soviet-Union there were approximately 500,000 denouncers/informers, and Nazi-Germany had approximately 20,000 informers, leaving out the unpaid informers. On the total population this might not seem that many, but we should not forget that for people in these societies it appeared like informers were everywhere. The main reason for this being of course the fact that they simply did not know who was an informer and who was not. As Robert Gellately points out, the main weapons of the Gestapo were the uncertainty and insecurity created by the use of informers.​[100]​ However, these main weapons did not always prove to be sufficient. In 1941 the Aachen Gestapo, in a secret report on controlling the Catholic Church, indicated that “the network of contact men for church affairs is not adequate enough.”​[101]​ This gives an idea of the relative nature of the degree of control the Gestapo had on German society. German citizens did of course not know this at the time. For them the threat of being informed on was very real, and therefore it was wiser not to get on the wrong side of the law.
The NKVD created a likewise situation. Madame M.V. Nechkina, attending a congress for historians in 1962, described the effects of the methods employed by the NKVD as creating a situation in which “comrade […] could not longer talk to comrade. One’s thoughts and doubts could no longer be exchanged with friends, no matter how close, not only because a friend might next day be one’s betrayer, but also out of consideration for the friend himself, from fear of putting him in a difficult situation by discussing this or that debatable question.”​[102]​ In a society where everyone can be an informer no one can know for sure who can be trusted and who cannot. And this being spied upon did not cease when one was caught. The NKVD and the Gestapo both operated even within the concentration camps, rewarding convict-informers with privileges and food.​[103]​ One Gestapo investigation, "chiefly through informers and torture", in concentration camp Dora led to 125 prisoners being shot for acts of sabotage as late as March 1945.​[104]​
Judging by their own numbers and style of operating the NKVD and Gestapo were mainly re-active organizations. They received a steady flow of information from their informers, and acted upon incriminating evidence. Occasionally the Gestapo and NKVD would act by placing agents within groups suspected of anti-state activities, but rather they would recruit vulnerable elements from within these groups. These people were vulnerable either because of personal traits or lifestyles (e.g. secret addicts, debtors, homosexuals, rakes) or because of their position in society.​[105]​ In the Soviet Union especially people who were in some way connected to an ‘enemy of the people’ were vulnerable to recruiting by the NKVD. They would be told that they themselves were under suspicion, but that they could prove themselves worthy and loyal citizens by informing on others.​[106]​ In a society with no other security than that offered by the state, it is no wonder many were all too prepared to cooperate, especially since the alternative would in all likeliness be jail time or worse. The Gestapo used similar techniques of persuasion, especially with people who had been known as socialists or communists before the NSDAP came into power in 1933.​[107]​ According to Gellately there even were Jews who informed on others, which is a grim yet also logical fact considering their difficult position.​[108]​ Claire Hall demonstrates that Jews were even among the paid Gestapo-informers.​[109]​ And of course, the popular anti-Semitism made sure the Gestapo was “helped by eager citizens, anxious to denounce Jews or those seen as ‘friends of Jews”.​[110]​ This has however to be differentiated by the Aachen Gestapo–report of 5 September 1935, which regretfully stated that: “[…] the Catholic population judged the Jews in the first instance as human beings.” ​[111]​ 
So both NKVD and Gestapo gathered information primarily through informers and denouncers. There were however differences in what happened with the information the NKVD and the Gestapo acquired. It almost appears as if the NKVD always responded with the arrest and interrogation of every person involved, while the Gestapo tried to get to the bottom of the matter. It seems as if the Gestapo sometimes was more reluctant to arrest large quantities of people while the NKVD had no such qualms. This however is not true. In my opinion the difference is that practically every arrest made by the NKVD automatically led to more arrests, while the Gestapo could cease an investigation after the arrest(s) had been made.​[112]​ And indeed, arresting innocent people did not bother most NKVD-officers, but the ‘spies and wreckers’ they might miss obsessed them. Yezhov, head of the NKVD during the big purge of 1936-1938 literally stated that the execution of an extra thousand people would be no big deal.​[113]​ Riasanovsky and Steinberg best illustrate the practice inherent to this cruel statement in their description of the Terror:
“Although earlier some engineers and other specialists, including foreigners, had been accused of sabotaging or wrecking the industrialization of the country, the real purge began in December 1934 with the assassination of one of the party leaders who was boss in Leningrad, Serge Kirov, and reached high intensity from 1936 to 1938. […] While uncounted people disappeared, the three great public trials featured sixteen Bolshevik leaders, notably Zinoviev and Kamenev, in 1936, another seventeen in 1937, and twenty-one more, including Bukharin and Rykov, in 1938. […] The purge spread and spread, affecting virtually all party organizations and government branches, the army, where Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top commanders perished at the same time, and almost every other prominent institution, including the political police itself. […] Those caught up in this widening circle of denunciations would likely be expelled from the party, fired from work, imprisoned, perhaps tortured (starting in the middle of 1937), send to a labor camp, or perhaps shot.”​[114]​ 
Victims also did not necessarily have to be arrested; the NKVD was not above faking car crashes or poisoning.​[115]​ The Terror might have been an extraordinary event, since over half of all people arrested were subsequently executed, something that was not common even in Stalin’s monstrous empire.​[116]​ However it was a common point of view among the NKVD-officers that one could better kill or arrest too many than too little. Especially when the officers themselves could be the next victims, there was a tendency of going “better too far than not far enough.”​[117]​ During the cannibalistic event of the Terror, Party-members and high officials especially were at risk. Orlando Figes tells of a joke that circulated in the USSR during the Terror: “The NKVD bangs on the door of an apartment in the middle of the night. ‘Who’s there?’ the man inside asks. ‘The NKVD, open up!' The man is relieved: 'No, no', he tells them, 'you've got the wrong apartment – the communists live upstairs!'”​[118]​
The Gestapo seems to have had different, perhaps more modest ambitions. Like the NKVD they tried to round up enemies of the regime, yet it appears they acted with considerably more precision.  In Robert Gellately’s book on the Würzburg Gestapo there are numerous cases that eventually did not lead to a single conviction. James S. Conway describes the persecution of the Churches overall as “sporadic and limited”. He also quotes Martin Bormann as saying that the latter only wanted “concrete and provable” cases against clerics of the Catholic Church.​[119]​ Compare this with Stalin's remark written on a list of people who were deemed politically unreliable and submitted to him by Yezhov: “Don't examine, just arrest!”​[120]​ 
Of course the Gestapo did not get its fearsome reputation by its gentlemanly conduct in investigations. Harassment and intimidation were part of their investigative inventory, and torture was widely applied to get prisoners to confess. Ian Kershaw notes that it was not uncommon for Gestapo-officers to arrest recalcitrant workers during weekends, arresting them on Saturday in the afternoon after work and releasing them on Monday morning.​[121]​ And in some cases the Gestapo could arrest people in massive sweeps. James Conway notes that when the Church struggle reached its zenith there were no qualms about arresting five hundred protestant clergymen all at once, and in the next sweep arresting all three hundred people who dared speak up on there behalf.​[122]​  And during the spring and summer of 1938 the Gestapo managed to arrest 10.000 so-called antisocials who were subsequently deported to Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and Flossenburg.​[123]​ But these actions appear to have been the maximum for the Gestapo, at least in the Reich itself.​[124]​ 
The NKVD not only investigated every link an arrestee might have, often they also inflicted punishment on everyone around the direct suspect. Through these waves of arrests entire professional or social environments could be destroyed. Direct family of an “enemy of the people” was fired from their jobs, lost houses and privileges and was reduced to poverty.​[125]​ During the Terror concentration camps were built especially for the families of their victims.​[126]​ At one of the luxurious Kremlin banquets, Stalin himself held a toast in which he stated: “To the complete destruction of all Enemies, them and their kin!”​[127]​ In Nazi-Germany the family of the culprits was rarely punished so severely, save for the families of the officers and aristocrats who tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944.​[128]​ But even then this was on direct order of Hitler, and certainly not a standard technique of the Gestapo. 
In Nazi-Germany there were other groups of people who were exterminated with kith and kin. The Gestapo, normally eager to find the culprit of a misdemeanor, in the case of Jews or other “sub-human” people also had a tendency of rather punishing too many than not enough. Johnson notes that “the likelihood of being investigated for any kind of illegal activity in the Third Reich was approximately ten times higher for Jews than for non-Jews.”​[129]​ Furthermore “non-Jews typically had their cases dismissed after brief investigations but […] Jews were very often punished severely for even minor and not necessarily proven infractions […].”​[130]​ In the Soviet Union, people once deemed enemies were treated somewhat similar, as is demonstrated by Peter Juviler. He tells of how a “girl already in prison nine times for theft of personal property had received a sentence of only two years this time. Another girl […] had received ten years for a small theft from a collective farm. She was a class enemy.”​[131]​ 
Nevertheless, the main difference between the Gestapo and the NKVD was probably the fact that the Gestapo tried to operate more specifically than the NKVD. Its goals also appear somewhat more limited; the numbers of supposed spies and wreckers were not fixed, whereas the numbers of Jews and Gypsies were.​[132]​
The way the two services operated when making a “normal” arrest was almost the same. Two agents were sent to the home of the victim, almost always in nighttime or early in the morning. They tried to act quick and silent as not to warn the neighbors. The agents would knock on the door, identify themselves and place the person they came for under arrest. Most victims would have their homes quickly searched for incriminating evidence.​[133]​ The arresting officers overall behaved fairly decent and correct, in order not to give the victim the impression something terrible was about to happen.​[134]​ There was often no need for shouting or bullying since the majority of the victims were already paralyzed by fear and shock. The agents tried to be done with the whole procedure before their victims could come to their senses. They were taken from their home in a police wagon and hauled of to the nearest jail, where they were subjected to interrogations. These interrogations could be extremely violent, including torture and occasionally the death of the person being interrogated. But often the mental anguish people suffered from actually being in this situation was enough to get any information the interrogators wanted.
These were the “normal” procedures. However both regimes have also instigated major sweeps of terror to root out opposition. In the USSR the Terror of 1936-1938 was a very different situation when compared with the war years. In Nazi-Germany the repression of the Jews was fairly moderate in the beginning, yet evolved to all-out genocide as the war proceeded. Nazi-Germany experienced, amongst other massive repressive actions, the major action following the Reichstag-fire, the purge of the SA, the Kristallnacht, and the purge of the conspirators who tried to assassinate Hitler. In all these actions the Gestapo played a significant role. The Soviet Union under Stalin experienced similar terror campaigns, for instance the collectivization of the countryside, the ensuing de-Kulakization, the Terror of 1936-1938 and the persecution of minorities (mainly Jews) in the so-called Doctors plot. In all these events the NKVD was the main operating body.
During these major operations, standard procedures were in abeyance. After the Reichstag-fire local SS and SA units began killing and imprisoning enemies of the Nazi's, who had all been carefully listed by the Gestapo. The purge of the SA, the Night of the Long Knives, was a gangster-like operation where political opponents of the regime were shot pointblank. SS and Gestapo hit men killed approximately 150 people, without even trying to make their actions look legitimate.​[135]​ Afterwards, Hitler simply stated: “For the last twenty four hours I was the Supreme court of the German people.”​[136]​ During the de-Kulakization the Soviet authorities wanted to incite class struggle in the countryside. They simply estimated how many Kulaks, rich peasants, each region might have. The Supreme Soviet ordered the local authorities to arrest or kill certain percentages of their population.​[137]​ The local communist leaders sometimes randomly picked people to fulfill their quota, occasionally over fulfilling them in order to show their communist zeal.​[138]​ 
Nazi-Germany and the Soviet-Union experienced a quite similar period of intense distress when the war situation turned to their disadvantage. Immediately after the German invasion of Soviet-Russia it was clear that the German armies would not be stopped easily. The NKVD was ordered to either evacuate or kill all prisoners who were in the line of the German advance. Eager to flee themselves, the NKVD-guards massacred the prisoners in their cells with hand grenades and machine guns.​[139]​ A likewise situation occurred in Germany when the unstoppable Red Army was marching towards Berlin. Hundreds of thousands were either forcefully evacuated out of or killed in the concentration camps. The Gestapo rounded up all “political unreliables”, executing them publicly as a warning to the local population not to cooperate with the Russians.​[140]​
Actions like these, in both systems, had not a lot to do with the usual police investigations. Armed men simply arrested or killed persons whose names were already on a list as potential or real enemies of the state. Denunciations were not needed in these cases, the victims were deemed enemies by the regime and therefore had to be eliminated. 
In conclusion we can state that the NKVD and the Gestapo worked likewise, yet had different aims. Both security services could arrest, interrogate, torture and execute people at will. The NKVD and the Gestapo were mainly responsive services, keeping open eyes and ears for denouncements. The big exception to this rule was when they were employed in massive security sweeps. But this was not a standard technique for the Gestapo. To quote James Conway: “In relatively few cases did the Gestapo use the full force of repression.”​[141]​ Even though the NKVD might have been more thorough in its sweep of society as a whole, we should not forget that both organizations were killing and imprisoning on a massive scale. 




What kind of people worked as officers in the NKVD and the Gestapo? Were they the sadists and completely cynical careerists they are often made out to be? Or were they more like they liked to portray themselves; misunderstood knights of the new order who fought for the survival of their class or race? 
A common aspect amongst the Nazi-functionaries that Paul and Mallmann examined is that almost all these men were too young too have experienced the First World War. They were only in their early teens when the War was being fought, experiencing the defeat of their country without being able to do anything about it, yet growing up with its mythology. According to Karin Orth “a segment of the male youth incorporated this mythology into their identity.”​[143]​ These men were part of the so-called Kriegsjugendgeneration​[144]​, convinced of the need to be violent and willing to kill and die for the cause. They had started their, often very violent, careers in chaotic post-war Germany, partaking in clashes between extreme rightwing Freikörper and communist street gangs. Similarly, many NKVD-men who carried out the Party-purges in 1936-1938 felt that they had also missed the forming experience of their lives. This generation was too young to partake in the Civil War. According to Orlando Figes, they therefore felt the urge to prove themselves worthy in fighting the enemies of Communism and Stalin.​[145]​ They leaped at every opportunity to show their zeal and commitment, seeing the internal purges as a continuation of the Civil war.​[146]​ As we have seen there were many Gestapo officials who had formerly been employed by the political police of the Weimar-republic. Fierce anti-Semitism (and, in all likeliness, anticommunism) was commonplace among German policemen before the Nazi takeover.​[147]​ Most likely all left-wing policemen were either converted to Nazism, sidetracked into administrative functions or send of into early retirement. Most kept their job probably because they managed to identify with the new regime enough to do its bidding. Nor were the political policemen alone in this respect. As Eric Johnson states: “[…] we know now that most of the judges and prosecutors in Nazi Germany were highly trained individuals who often had remained in the same positions they had held in the democratic Weimar Republic.”​[148]​ Gellately describes one high official, Franz Josef Huber, who actually had denounced colleagues before the Nazi takeover for using the greeting 'Heil Hitler!’ However, this was no impediment for the RSHA to make him Gestapo-chief in Vienna in 1939.​[149]​ But, to be sure, most Gestapo-officers were or became Nazi's, or at least anticommunist, anti-Semitic, right wing conservatives. Gellately quotes a former Gestapo-official as saying “that many of the higher officials were by no means all Nazi's. For the most part they were young professional civil service officers who felt ashamed at having been placed in this den of thieves.”​[150]​ This, however, is probably put too easily; after all, everyone with a reasonably clear mind knew what the Gestapo did. As Overy states: “Arrest, investigation and deportation were the responsibilities of the political police force […]”.​[151]​ Gerhard Paul and Klaus-Michael Mallmann claim that it were most (former) military men and police-officers, “unzufriedenen Männern” who were looking for “Existenzsicherheit und Karrierechance”, who flooded into the repressive organs of the Nazi-state.​[152]​ After all “der Machtantritt der National-sozialisten und der damit verbundene Ausbau des Polizeiapparates eröffnete weitere Karrierechancen.”​[153]​ 
According to Levytsky the NKVD-officers were of a variety of backgrounds. However almost all were convinced communists (or, like Lavrenti Beria, managed to hide their sepsis very well). Immediately after the Revolution there were a lot of what Levytsky calls “Romantic Terror[ists]”​[154]​ in the Cheka. These leather coat and cartridge belt-wearing men saw themselves as makers of revolution, warriors of Marxism, not as police-officers. There were very flamboyant figures amongst them, most notably Felix Dzerzhinsky himself; a writer and poet merged with a sadistic knight of the proletariat.​[155]​ During Stalin’s reign, the image of the service changed. His NKVD needed not to make revolution; it needed to root out spies and opposition. The flamboyance and romanticism of the revolution gave way to a grim systematized seek-and-destroy mentality. Stalin’s personal NKVD-thugs were brutal torturers like Yezhov, Beria and Abakumov, who interrogated prisoners personally.​[156]​ Their underlings were, at least to the outside world, almost faceless and robotic myrmidons. According to Robert Conquest these men were quite literally disposable; “the actual expertise could readily have been mastered in a few weeks – most of it available in a little book”.​[157]​ Since the NKVD-agents themselves were closely watched they often tried to make as much arrests as possible, trying to show their loyalty to the state. As Levytsky put it: “A part of Stalin's 'strategic genius' in the struggle for personal power was his faculty of getting rid of his closest supporters at the right time, so as to secure the continuity of his own plans, without having to pay the penalty for all that had happened in the meantime.”​[158]​
Moshe Lewin points out another interesting difference between the Gestapo (or, for that matter the SS) and the NKVD. The Gestapo drew most of its agents from amongst “professional academics – notably lawyers, judges and […] nobility”.​[159]​ These people were educated, often relatively well to do and thus were socially considered (upper) middle class. Working in the Gestapo was not automatically considered to be a dark and evil thing. Higher Gestapo-officials were in any case not the persons who handled informers or made arrests; rather they were the brains of the organization, planning operations from behind desks.​[160]​ Their main goal was to do their job as good as possible in order to make a career, what Paul and Mallmann have called “engagierte Profiteure der Tat.”​[161]​ These men were in a position where their “Überzeugung und Eigennutz, der Vollzug einer Weltanschauung und der Rausch grenzenloser Macht”​[162]​ all contributed to their own personal benefit.
The NKVD-men on the other hand were often considered to be the dregs of society.​[163]​ The brute force applied by the Chekists in the Civil War left its mark on the Russian population; they often saw the NKVD as nothing more than a, at times maybe useful, murderous bunch of criminals. In this they were of course not completely mistaken. Especially during the Terror there were a lot of men who, purely because of their proletarian roots combined with a thirst for power, enrolled in the NKVD. They were incapable of investigation in any other form than using brute force on defenseless persons.​[164]​ It almost appears as if during the Terror the only requirement to become an operative in the NKVD was to have no conscience whatsoever. In this period it is often hard to discriminate between common gangsters and NKVD-officers.  According to Levytsky, after the Terror, under the leadership of Beria, the character of the NKVD changed. He states that the “treacherous assassinations and blind terror of the Yagoda and Yezhov period” ceased, and that “the expert came to the fore.”​[165]​ This in my opinion was not such a drastic change as Levytsky claims; the NKVD-men received better training perhaps, but it is very doubtful that their moral fiber increased as well. After all, the mass killing and torturing of innocents did not cease after the Terror, and cynical opportunists could still find their way in the NKVD. However, there also were zealous communists in the NKVD, like this testimony of a former guard at the White Sea Canal illustrates: 
“I did not understand why we had to drive so many convicts to their deaths to finish the canal. Why did it have to be done so fast? At times it troubled me. But I justified it by the conviction that we were building something great, not just a canal, but a new society that could not have been built by voluntary means.”​[166]​ 
Perhaps trying to define between true believers and opportunists is a bit too anachronistic; after all, the communist high priest Stalin himself was an arch-opportunist. He showed no qualms about working together with whomever as long as it helped him achieve his goals.




Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin did not start out as the murderous systems they would later be infamous for. Both dictatorships underwent a crisis, which, their leaders felt, urged them to give their repressive organizations almost unlimited power. After the Reichstag fire in 1933 the German police gained the right to take anybody they wanted into ‘protective custody’, Schutzhaft in German. Once a person had been taken in protective custody, he or she could be detained indeterminably, without the right to an attorney or even knowing the charges.​[167]​ In Soviet Russia, the murder of Leningrad boss Serge Kirov in 1934 produced the so-called Kirov- or 1st December laws.​[168]​ These laws provided the authorities with a same kind of draconian omnipotence.​[169]​ So both countries created a legal footing for the repression of (possible) malcontents. The organizations that dealt with punishing and controlling their disobedient citizens also changed. As Stalin’s power grew the NKVD became more and more his own realm, instead of the defender of communism. After the murder of Leningrad’s first commissar Kirov in 1934 Stalin decided to deal with his real and imagined enemies once and for all. On his order the Board of Justice was abolished, which up until this point had tried to safeguard at least some legal procedures.​[170]​ In its place came the so-called Special Boards, which in the Terror would be known as troikas; tribunals of three NKVD-men who could sentence anyone to death or imprisonment.​[171]​ Lists of names of people who were to be arrested began circulating, not only from the Kremlin but also from local NKVD-units. Through the so-called Kirov-law the NKVD virtually had gotten a carte blanche to repress whoever they wanted. So the Soviet-government ordered the zealous young communists in the NKVD to arrest more ‘enemies of the people’, while they in their turn urged the central government to take ever stronger measures. The ensuing killing frenzy finally had to be halted by Stalin. 
The Gestapo experienced a period of ‘cumulative radicalization’ not unsimilar to that of the NKVD. The Reichstag-fire and the ensuing legislation of arbitrary state repression allowed for ever greater ferocity in dealing with the regimes enemies. From 1938 onwards the state intensified its actions against certain groups, notably homosexuals, ‘anti-socials’ and the handicapped. In the state system of Nazi-Germany the new laws gave the political police almost unlimited power to repress whomever they thought necessary. The ensuing outbreak of war gave officials the emergency-situation in which every action seemed justified. And as the tide of the war turned against Germany the interior repression grew. The Nazi’s of the Kriegsjugendgeneration saw violence as the answer to every form of popular discontent. To quote Gellately, “as the war was literally brought home to Germany the Gestapo grew more ruthless than ever”​[172]​.




It has become clear that the massive repression and murder of certain groups of people was known to at least some people in Germany and Russia at the time. There was no way one could have been a socially active citizen in either society without noticing at least something of the massive repression. Richard Overy clearly shows that by the end of World War Two, Germany was divided in a free and an un-free world.​[173]​ These worlds touched upon each other many times, with for instance concentration camp inmates being hired out to private entrepreneurs.​[174]​ This was the new order in practice, as designed by the regime and as supported by a large part of the population. In the Soviet-Union the construction of the infamous Belomor-canal by political prisoners was widely covered in the press, with famous poets and writers visiting the site and writing in praise about its purpose of re-educating the bourgeoisie​[175]​. In Nazi Germany “SS families often used inmates as servants, gardeners or other help”.​[176]​ The citizens of the USSR and Nazi-Germany knew about the concentration camps (Dachau for instance was opened with a press-conference​[177]​) and did adapt themselves to the regimes that made these possible. In both societies, the crimes committed by the regime were by no means “secret events that occurred in specially cordoned-off zones in “the east” to which no witnesses were granted access.”​[178]​ They knew that for a person to get on the wrong side of the regime was very dangerous. Involuntary involvement with the secret police was a very negative and possibly lethal experience.
History has left various examples of people who either denounced or were denounced in both states. Unfortunately none of these cases have been documented in their entirety. This of course would not have been possible, since we simply can not know what inner reasons people may have had for their actions. We also can only guess at how they felt about what they were doing. But we can try to understand the positions people found themselves in, and examine what they did in the given situation. Of course we must be careful not to pass judgment, since the purpose of history is not to judge but to understand the past. This is not easy to do in some of the cases listed below. 
I have chosen the following cases because of the fact that they were the most extensively described, even though the information given sometimes still seems marginal. The cases I have selected are taken from two books that have been written in different years and with different objectives. The Gestapo and German society, written by Robert Gellately and first published in 1990, focuses on the organization and methods of the Gestapo, only secondarily touching upon the victims. The whisperers, written by Orlando Figes and published in 2007, was written primarily from the point of view of common people in the Soviet Union under Stalin. Furthermore it must be mentioned that Gellately has studied “only” the Würzburg-area, which is a part of Germany, while Figes has tried to include the entire Soviet Union. A regionally based study can obviously make no claim to be typical of Germany as a whole. Still, when reading both books I found remarkable common features. Gellately and Figes have tried to approach their subject on a personal scale. They have not just stated facts; rather they have painted pictures of persons and situations. The focus on the individual and the attention for personal cases in both books make the past really come to life. As an, in my view indispensable, illustration of the reality of living in a totalitarian society I have decided to add ten cases from both books. The following cases will show in what various ways one could get on the wrong side of the Gestapo or the NKVD.
The Gestapo files from Würzburg, as described by Robert Gellately, give us an interesting insight in everyday life in Nazi-Germany. 
Case one came into being late 1943, when Johann Müller, father of two, overheard Hugo Engelhardt making a derogatory remark about families having more than three children. Since Nazi-authorities encouraged people to have as many children as possible, this was considered a felony. He reported Engelhardt, who was brought to trial.​[179]​ 
Case two is about a nurse, Maria Markler, who turned in Pastor Bach to the authorities. He supposedly had advised a local boy not to join the Hitler youth. Nothing of this turned out to be true; the boy apparently bore a grudge against the priest, so the priest was not persecuted.​[180]​ 
Case three centers on Dr. Ludwig Kneisel, who reported Ilse Totzke to the local Gestapo for “suspicious behavior”. In this he was not alone, many neighbors had complained about Ilse being “different”. The doctor claimed he felt bound by his duty as a reserve officer to report her. Totzke eventually died in Ravensbrück.​[181]​ 
Mr. Otto Leucht turned in Walburga Grafenberger for associating with Jews. After months of investigating her mail, there was nothing to the case. She had been seen socializing with a young man, but since in one of his letters he had asked Walburga to help with farm work, the Gestapo deduced that he couldn’t be Jewish. The assumption being that Jews did not work on farms.​[182]​ 
Bernard Martin accused the Jewish woman Anna Laska of being a prostitute and of sleeping with German men. Under investigation Bernard Martin admitted to having had sexual intercourse with this woman himself, and out of fear of getting in trouble had decided to denounce her before she could denounce him. He was sentenced to one year in prison.​[183]​ 
Paul Hellman turned in his neighbors, Christoff and Babette Klostermann, for being too friendly to their Polish domestic servant Janka. After investigation it was uncovered that the true reason for the whole matter was a long running feud with their neighbors, born out of conflicting business interests. The Klostermanns were however warned not to associate with Poles.​[184]​ 
Case seven describes how Michael Linz turned in barmaid Else Mores for not selling him a pack of cigarettes, while offering loose cigarettes to Poles. Petty jealousy and frustration undoubtedly added up to the felt insult, and Else Mores was warned not to give scarce goods to Poles.​[185]​ 
Doctor Brasch caused a lot of misery by informing the local Gestapo of the pregnancy of Cäcilie Bauer. It was discovered that she had had a relation with the Polish POW Kasimer Jankovski, and that her friend Elfriede Kort had had a relation with another Polish POW, Eduard Koncik. The two girls were mere teenagers so they were only briefly imprisoned. The two Polish men were send to a concentration camp where they were executed. The doctor explained his denunciation by stating he “felt duty-bound to protecting the village youth.”​[186]​ 
Dr. Karl Wesen and his student Jürgen Ernst did not need the authorities in correcting “wrong” behavior. Instead they took it upon themselves to correct the “provocative” behavior of the Jewish Alfons Golom and his friend Helena Valentin. After chasing the couple through the street and physically threatening them, they denounced Alfons and Helena to the local Gestapo on the ground of race defilement.​[187]​ 
Block leader Treu denounced Cäcile Heim and the Jewish merchant Albert Kuppel on the same charge. The couple was under investigation for months, until Kuppel suddenly died of natural causes. Treu probably acted out of greed, since he was a merchant in the same trade as Kuppel.​[188]​ 
Status of the denunciator	Status of the denounced	“Crime” of the denounced	Punishment
?	?	Making a derogatory remark about large families. 	Brought to trial, sentence unknown.
Nurse	Priest	Had advised against joining the Hitler youth	None.
Doctor/reserve-officer	?	Suspicious behavior.	Concentration camp.
?	Farmer	Associating with Jews.	None.
Truck driver	?	Being a Jewish prostitute and sleeping with German men.	?
Market gardener	Market gardener	Being too friendly to their Polish domestic servant. 	Warning.
Fruit and gardening business-owner	Barmaid	Offering cigarettes to Poles, while denying them to a German.	10 mark fine.
Doctor	Schoolgirls/Polish POW's	Sexual relations with a Polish POW (race-defilement)	Brief imprisonment/execution.
Doctor and student	Typist-clerk	“Provocative” behavior and alleged race-defilement.	?
Block leader	Merchant and widow	Race-defilement.	None.
Table 2: German denunciation cases

The NKVD-cases are unfortunately less well documented, however they too give a glimpse of the various reasons why one would denounce others. Orlando Figes has described the following cases in The Whisperers.
Case one is a denouncement made during a confrontation in a NKVD-prison. Volodia Diakonov denounced his longtime friend Yevgeniia Ginzburg for being a member of a “counterrevolutionary terrorist group”. The NKVD only wanted him to state that she was a member, and then he would be of the hook. So Volodia probably acted out of fear for his own life, since he would be arrested if he did not denounce Ginzburg.​[189]​ She got ten years in a labor camp.​[190]​
Aleksandr Marian, local leader of the Komsomol, denounced his father Timofei for criticizing the policy of collectivization. He states that he did this out of a feeling of duty. Timofei was send to a labor camp.​[191]​ 
Case three is a good example of how complete gibberish still could lead to a lot of suffering. Mitrofan Moiseyenko was denounced by his neighbors, since he allegedly “had hidden Trotsky”. It probably all boiled down to an ordinary dispute over money. Nevertheless Mitrofan was send to the Gulag.​[192]​ 
Case four shows another person denouncing his own kin. Aleksandr Tvardovsky denounced his father and brother when they had escaped from exile. He probably did this from a mixture of anxiety, inner conviction and duty, since in their absence he had become somewhat of a successful and popular figure. His father and brother were deported back into exile.​[193]​ 
Lipa Kaplan was denounced by her factory boss because she refused to respond to his attentions. She had made an incautious remark after the murder of Kirov, three years before, which the jilted lover now used against her. She was sentenced to ten years in Kolyma, a very lethal Gulag labor camp.​[194]​ 
Case six is a famous denouncement, used by the regime to encourage children to inform on their families. Pavlik Morozov denounced his father Trofim for allegedly selling false papers to kulaks. He probably acted out of a personal grudge and it cost his father his freedom and eventually his life. However this case also cost Pavlik and his younger brother their lives, since the rest of his family was understandably outraged at his betrayal. Pavlik Morozov thus became a martyr for all communist youth organizations.​[195]​ 
The entire Dubov-family was denounced by the friend of their daughter, who was a Komsomol-member, because they had disguised their kulak-origins. The Dubovs were deported, lost their right of residence and all their possessions were confiscated.​[196]​ 
Case eight centers on Valerii Frid. He was a student recruited as an informer by the NKVD in 1941, after being arrested himself. Threatened by his interrogators he was left with the choice to denounce others or face serious consequences. Eventually he reported three fellow students for minor infractions, which did not lead to any convictions.​[197]​ 
A woman named Zina denounced her professor for poking fun at a speech Stalin had made. She claimed she had acted out of conviction, yet she made this claim while she was being held captive in the Lubianka-prison for failing to denounce another teacher.​[198]​  
In the final case, a certain Ivan Miachin denounced fourteen local party leaders within one year. He justifies this by stating that he thought that was what the regime expected from him. Yet his frantic denunciations also helped advance his career, so personal advantages could scarcely have had no influence at all.​[199]​ 
Status of the denunciator	Status of the denounced	“Crime” of the denounced	Punishment
Writer/editor	Wife of a senior party leader.	Being member of a “counterrevolutionary terrorist group”.	10 years in a labor camp.
Local leader of the Komsomol	?	Criticizing the policy of collectivization.	Labor camp.
?	Factory worker	“Had hidden Trotsky”.	Labor camp.
Popular poet	Peasant	Escaped from exile.	Exile.
Factory Boss	Factory worker?	Making an incautious remark.	Ten years in a labor camp.
Farmhand?	Peasant	Selling false papers to kulaks.	Execution.
Komsomol-member	Farmers/workers	Had disguised their kulak-origins.	Deported and lost their right of residence.
Student	Students	?	None.
Student?	Professor	Poking fun at a speech of Stalin.	Arrested, sentence unknown.
Civil servant?	Party and Soviet leaders	?	?




So what do these denunciation-cases tell us about the functioning of secret services in totalitarian systems? Eric Johnson has noted that “[…] even if no one ever denounced anyone […] many of the major crimes against humanity […] would still have occurred”​[200]​ meaning that the hundreds of thousands of Kulaks or Jews were already on prepared lists, and only had to be picked up. While this may be true, it only diminishes the wretchedness of denunciations on a quantitative and not on a qualitative level. Furthermore, while this statement adds perspective, it does not give us answers as to why people were denounced. 
When considering the denunciation-machinery in both totalitarian systems, it is important to understand the fact that, like the denounced, the denouncers were anything but a homogeneous group. In the past it has too easily been assumed that denunciators were social misfits or outcasts who tried to avenge themselves on society. They were often portrayed as jealous freeloaders from societies lower social strata, eager to contribute to the downfall of their social superiors.​[201]​ Yet when we consider the cases above, we can see that there is no substantial evidence for this. The denouncers were doctors, factory bosses, nurses, students, farmers, and factory workers; in fact a reasonable cross-section of society. 
I have already noted that a lot of denouncers were blackmailed into cooperation by the regimes. However there were also denouncers who simply worked for money or other profits. Claire M. Halls recent article, An army of spies? The Gestapo spy network 1933-45 divides the informers and denouncers into four subgroups, all with different reasons and ways of cooperating with the regime. She especially recognizes official and unofficial informers, who were divided by the fact whether they were paid or not.​[202]​ In my opinion this is too easy. Payment might have been a factor, but certainly not the only one. For instance, people also reported on each other out of fear of the authorities. Bernard Martin apparently denounced a Jewess to hide the fact that he had had intercourse with this woman because he was afraid of the consequences if it came out. Volodia Diakonov and Valerii Frid were afraid of what the authorities might do if they did not cooperate. But this would not automatically mean that they would refuse payment of some sort. Walter Weyrauch, a German working for the American authorities in post-war-Germany, concluded that “most of the informers were opponents of the Nazi-regime, even persecuted people, who secretly acted as agents of the Nazi regime.”​[203]​ Hall describes the case of Jewish Gestapo-informers who received incentives to inform on other Jews; “one relative was taken of the list for every catch brought in, plus 200 RM a head (!)”​[204]​There were many reasons, often intertwined, to denounce another person. Being threatened as well as rewarded at the same time was not uncommon. As Gellately expressed this interaction: “The brutalities of the Gestapo […] contributed to the atmosphere of foreboding in which compliance seemed more and more advisable.”​[205]​  The NKVD created a likewise situation. Arch Getty's statement that during the 1930's there was no “pervasive fear” in the Soviet Union​[206]​ comes into conflict with the cases of Volodia Diakonov and Valerii Frid. They in all likeliness cooperated with the authorities primarily out of fear.
Some cases however also note the sense of duty certain denouncers claimed to have felt. Doctor Kneisel and doctor Brasch both claimed to feel duty bound to inform the authorities, as did Aleksandr Marian, Aleksander Tvardovsky and Ivan Miachin. Yet it is very probable that a person like Ivan Miachin also acted out of personal ambition, since his career went swimmingly because of his denunciations. He was probably rewarded for his “sense of duty”. Paul Hellman and the neighbors of the unfortunate Mitrofan Moiseyenko were probably motivated by their disputes with the persons they were to denounce, while the factory boss who denounced Lipa Kaplan was in all likeliness motivated by a feeling of rejection. The basest of human emotions were powerful motivational forces.
To understand these cases in their historical context it is important to keep in mind that all these denouncers probably acted out of more than one reason. People could at the same time be greedy, jealous and frustrated as well as staunch supporters or opponents of the regime. There is no sure way of knowing which reason mattered most. And people could and would of course lie or twist the truth if it helped them in any way. For instance, a denouncer would never admit to be a sadist who simply enjoyed watching other people suffer. He or she would in all likelihood claim to be an upstanding and concerned citizen, acting out of moral indignation and loyalty to the regime. And perhaps the political officers handling the case sometimes had their own reasons to overestimate the ideological zeal of the denouncer. Ian Kershaw has rightfully noted that, “reconstruction of opinion in [totalitarian states] has to rely upon reported opinion, in sources moreover which were compiled for particular administrative and political purposes […]”​[207]​. Some denouncers were extremely cunning in using the regime for their own benefit. So the NKVD and the Gestapo had to trust their informers, and in doing so they took “a calculated risk which on some occasions failed.”​[208]​ 
With all these factors and conditions considered, what could we conclude from the cases mentioned? First of all, that they are too few and too specific to make any general claims. These cases provide no general rule as to why the inhabitants of the areas under investigation turned one another in. We cannot say that fear was a more potent force in the Soviet Union, while conviction was stronger in Nazi-Germany. Neither can we state that Germans were more eager to denounce than Russians. We can however state that there had to be some sort of reward for the denouncer. This reward could be “material”, like money, a promotion or the liquidation of a (business)-rival. It could also be immaterial, like feeling useful or getting revenge, or simply feeling part of the new society.
We should not forget that the moral universe of people who lived in a totalitarian regime differed completely from our own. When the state claims that it is the sole judge of right and wrong, and there is no other institution willing to challenge this claim, it is hard to form an independent worldview. To quote Ulrich Herbert: “[…] seeing their own actions within the context of such a worldview [i.e. Nazism or Communism] provided that exculpatory discourse that lessened inhibitions and offered an avenue of self justification by representing ones own actions as the necessary means to a higher end, thus suspending acquired humanitarian principles.”​[209]​ 
So personal views on right and wrong could, almost unconsciously, get severely distorted. The friend of their daughter who denounced the Dubov family was a Komsomol member, who probably was still in her teens. She may have had little influences on her worldview other than the propaganda she was confronted with on a daily basis. And Aleksandr Tvardovsky, even though he was a grown man capable of self-reflection, as is shown in his poetry, still reported on his own family (partly) out of belief in communism. He was convinced that, after all: “The liquidation of the Kulaks as a class does not mean the liquidation of people, even less the liquidation of children...”​[210]​
Aleksandr Marian, explaining why he had denounced his father, wrote: “If only [my father] had known the laws of the dialectic, if only he had been politically literate, he would have recognized the error of his views and would have recanted them. ​[211]​ Believing in the righteousness of the regime was a very strong incentive for cooperation. And it would take a very independent and strong mind to be able to withstand the constant barrage of propaganda. The political police forces did not purely have to rely “on the worst traits of the people and it's encouragement of them”.​[212]​
And then there is the easily overlooked explanation for denouncing others; the wish of human beings to be part of something bigger than themselves. An interesting and important remark on this subject is made by George Denicke, in the Discussion on the Psychological aspects of Totalitarianism as written in Totalitarianism. He states that “wanting to agree” is something different from “wanting to belong”, even though he admits that these things have some overlap.​[213]​ I think that this is a very important point; the wish to belong to a certain group does not automatically mean complete agreement with everything the group does or stands for. As social beings, humans as a rule want to be part of a group. The wish to be part can make us turn a blind eye to negative aspects, and focus only on the positive aspects. We must not forget that both regimes were popular movements, embodying at least in some ways deeply felt values and norms of the populations they controlled. Nazism and communism were not created separate from the societies they controlled; they grew in and adapted themselves to these societies. That is one of the reasons both were capable of gaining massive support for their policies, by being receptive and understanding to the needs of society. For a lot of German and Soviet citizens the states they lived in symbolized the future, which they were eager to be a part of. The states and the ideologies of communism and Nazism were part of their personal identity. Consider for instance this Soviet children's song from the nineteen thirties: 

Believing in our country is so easy,
Breathing in our country is so free:
Our glorious, beloved Soviet land...
Our Soviet life is so good and bright
That children in ages to come
Will probably cry in their beds at night
Because they were not born in our lifetime.​[214]​

Songs like these were not simply indoctrination of innocent children by malignant adults. Many citizens were genuinely convinced the future would be better because of the 'New Order'. This new order also meant a new view on morality; it was no longer considered wrong to betray someone, but it was considered wrong to let a Jew poison the Volk. It was not thought of as wrong to tell on your neighbor, but it was considered wrong to let “counterrevolutionary elements” destroy the revolution. And of course there are the unknown consequences when one chooses not to inform on another person; what if the regime was right after all? 
Nowadays it is easily forgotten that people were subjected to propaganda wherever they went. Even if someone was skeptical about the regime, this barrage of altered facts and misinformation could not fail to have at least some effect. Sometimes subconsciously, standards and values, ethical and moral outlooks changed. From this point of view, the statement of Aleksandr Marian suddenly does not seem all that absurd anymore. He did what he considered morally right, and with the backing of the dominant political views of his day and age. Aleksandr Marian identified his ethics and his persona with the state he lived in. This identification brings to mind what Harry Eckstein and David Apter have noted about the nature of totalitarianism: “The essence of totalitarianism, then, is that it annihilates all boundaries between the state […] and the individual personality.”​[215]​ This aspect of totalitarianism was a very strong incentive for many denunciations by ordinary citizens. They saw themselves as a part of a new and better system, and felt the need to show that they were law-abiding citizens. And even the most independent minded individual who had a strong sense of justice might “eventually give up the struggle to conform to his former ego-ideal and resign with more or less bitterness to the practice of deceit and denunciation, all in the name of ‘you’ve got to live somehow,’ and ‘I have my family to think of.​[216]​’  Most people want to live comfortably, peacefully and happily. The regimes knew this very well, and made sure that loyal denouncers were rewarded with what they desired. 
The victims

For those individuals who were not to be part of the world as envisioned by the regimes, the New Order was miserable at best. It is impossible to say how many people exactly fell victim to the Nazi and Communist regimes. The secrecy both regimes tried to uphold, the chaos of the war years and the inevitable hand of time all contribute to a swamp of estimates and guesses. First of all because there were so many ways in which a person could be victimized. When, for instance, a man was arrested, his direct family, wife, children and social environment were severely shaken as well. Yet these people are often not counted in the statistics. Neither are the many people who developed mental or emotional problems because of the psychological strain under which they were forced to live. 
Then there are the millions of soldiers and civilians who died or were wounded during the Second World War. Estimates of fatal casualties on the Eastern Front alone range from 20 to 40 million. It is often difficult to attribute these casualties to the one dictatorship or the other. And even if it is clear which regime was responsible it is not always clear to which action the victims should be attributed. For instance, historian Hans Mommsen states that the Nazi regime killed 5.5 million Jews as well as three million Soviet POWs.​[217]​ However there also served a lot of Jews in the Soviet army; are these people to be counted as war casualties or as victims of genocidal racial policies? And what about the case described by Levytsky, where the NKVD sends a spy to the German-occupied Donets-basin. The spy posed as a former White Guard willing to cooperate with the Germans. He denounced local Communist Party members to the Gestapo, who were subsequently arrested and shot. After this the spy disappeared. The Gestapo later found out he was an agent send by the Soviet authorities to punish those Party members who had failed to follow the order to accompany the retreating Red Army. The NKVD had effectively used the Gestapo as its instrument.​[218]​ Should these deaths be counted as victims of Stalin’s purges, of Hitler’s genocide or as war casualties?
These questions are not easily answered. The exact numbers of victims of both regimes will probably never be known, but there are reliable estimates. The number of Jews murdered in the Holocaust in all likeliness approaches six million. Gypsies, homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, priests of every denomination and other victims add hundreds of thousands more to this number. The Stalinists shot approximately 730.000 “terrorists, Trotskyites and wreckers” between 1934 and 1945.​[219]​ According to the historian V.M. Zemskov, as quoted in Pavlova's article, 681.692 of this number were shot during the Terror.​[220]​ Hundreds of thousands more froze or starved to death in the Gulag. During the collectivization of the countryside between 2.5 and five million people died of hunger in the Ukraine alone, the numbers for the rest of the USSR being unknown.​[221]​ However scholarly debate on the issue whether the famine was created by the regime or was an unwanted side effect continues, it is clear that the Soviet government bears the responsibility. Shortly before and during the war the NKVD deported entire peoples, such as the Chechens, Ingushes, Karachayers, Kalmyks, Volga-Germans and Krim Tartars to barren wastelands in Siberia and the Urals, where many died of poor living conditions.​[222]​ The authorities knew this, but no effort was made to improve their lot. Total death estimates for Stalin’s reign range from little fewer than four million to seven million.​[223]​ 
In addition to all those murdered and starved an enormous number of people served longer or shorter spells in the concentration camps of both systems. When comparing the numbers of victims of the Stalinist and Nazi crimes, it is of the utmost importance to realize that numbers do not tell the whole story; one cannot quantify suffering. Still, these numbers provide an illustration of the massive scale of these crimes.















Fig. 1 Numbers of inmates of Soviet and Nazi concentration camps. Richard Overy, The dictators (London and New York 2004) 612-613

When we look at the numbers of people who were held captive in the concentration camps, it is especially important to realize that these numbers represent a steady flow of people. Numerous inmates died, were murdered, relocated, released or escaped over the years. Especially in the early years of the Nazi-regime, before the mass-murdering program of the Final Solution was put in motion, people were often put in a concentration camp for a limited time. They were mostly Jews, socialists, communists, and priests of both denominations who had spoken out against Nazism. During the Kristallnacht, the Nazi’s arrested thousands of Jewish men, who were locked up in the camps. Deaths by shooting or maltreatment did occur, but these camps were not yet the killing factories of the late war years; most were released within weeks.​[224]​ The entire death toll for Dachau in 1933 was ‘only’ 21.​[225]​
The Gulag in the early days of Stalin’s reign also did not yet resemble the later tightly sealed conglomerates of slaves. Escapes were frequent, because of a shortage of guards and because corruption was thriving.​[226]​
The concentration camps of both regimes clearly were not alike. While the Gulag was an extremely lethal environment, it in no way resembled the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The Jews and Gypsies who happened to be caught by the Gestapo had a very slim chance to survive, while the victims of the NKVD-camps had a reasonable chance to make it out alive, though often physically and mentally devastated. Overy states that: “In Germany Jews could not become Aryans, any more than a crippled child could learn to walk; their fate was sealed. But in the Soviet Union the whole object of social and welfare policy was to create the conditions that would eradicate crime and social deviancy and enhance health and social wellbeing.”​[227]​ However, the way this utopia was realized was brutal to say the least. The famous novel by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, A day in the life of Ivan Denisovich, paints a grimly realistic picture of life in a soviet concentration camp. Richard Overy estimates that approximately 14.6 percent of all inmates in the Gulag died or were murdered, while the German camps had an average lethality of 40 percent. On the other hand, the NKVD shot an enormous amount of people, whom in Nazi-Germany would probably have not been punished so severely.​[228]​ And the Soviet government had other ways of dealing with ‘socially dangerous elements’. Millions of people, sometimes complete ethnic groups, were deported to remote areas. They were often just dumped in barren wastelands, either in Siberia, the far north or the Urals. Between 1934 and 1945 there were 5.181.121 people who suffered this fate.​[229]​ Nazi officials also deported mainly Polish people deemed “incapable of Germanization” to sparsely populated areas where these innocent civilians had to endure famine and disease.
When we compare the enormous numbers of victims, counted in millions, with the number of political police officials, counted in tens of thousands, we can state that both states had a tremendously productive “legal” system. One could almost say that the officers and other employees of the German and Soviet secret services must have been tireless workaholics. In 1942 for example, the NKVD shot 23,278 people, put 88,809 in concentration camps and exiled a further 7070, with 5249 getting some other sort of punishment.​[230]​ This totaled 124,406 sentenced cases in this year, which was also a dramatic war year for the Soviet Union, with less than two thirds of its own population still under its control. Since the NKVD men probably had a lot of other matters on their hands, this was quite an achievement indeed. In the last years of the Third Reich, the Gestapo also worked ferociously. It was plain to see that Germany's defeat was imminent, and the state had to be kept from falling into anarchy. Over 1.7 million Polish workers had been forced into German industry and agriculture by 1944, and they were becoming a threat to domestic society.​[231]​ From July to September 1943 105,262 foreign, mainly Polish, workers and servants were arrested.​[232]​ For 1944 and 1945 there are no reliable figures, since the authorities stopped registering all their dealings with foreign workers. In these periods it is very difficult to differentiate between the operations at the front line and policing in the interior, since both regimes waged war on a part of its own population. But the amount of arrestees is enormous considering the small police apparatuses. 




The systems of Nazi-Germany and the USSR were different in a lot of aspects, yet the same in even more. Both countries waged war against a part of their own population, throwing the full weight of their security and judicial systems against groups of people who in practically every other nation of that day and age would have been considered innocent. There was no freedom of speech, freedom of congregation, freedom of press or freedom of movement for large groups in both states. Both states were “run by a one-man, one-party dictatorship, full of concentration camps and secret policemen”​[235]​. But Nazi-Germany and the Soviet-Union under Stalin were not like Hobbes’s Leviathan; they were popular regimes, supported by many citizens. Both regimes were the product as well as the transmitters of an aggressive and pervasive ideology, convinced of its own historical correctness. The two ideologies took care of their supporters, by creating jobs and housing, providing medical aid and schooling and by amusing citizens through mass-entertainment and leisure-activities. In short, both regimes were totalitarian.
Nazi's and Stalinists deployed secret police forces against malcontents and other groups they considered enemies. In Nazi-Germany and the USSR the Gestapo and the NKVD had approximately the same tasks, though they were rather different in organization. The NKVD was larger than the Gestapo; however it also had more tasks. Both regimes had remarkably little political policemen. When it came to controlling the population and the battle against enemies of the regime they largely used the same methods. Harassment, arrests, torture, blackmail and bribery were common. Both systems had a system of law that granted their police forces almost complete freedom to act as they saw fit. Their goals were ideologically different but practically similar: the creation of a utopia without ‘undesirable elements’. 
In this striving for a ‘better tomorrow’, both secret services were assisted by the people of their respective state. Either voluntarily or involuntarily, rewarded or unrewarded, actively or passively, citizens participated in the policing of other citizens. We have seen in what various ways people denounced or were denounced, and how the secret police apparatuses used fear, greed, jealousy and patriotism to get people to cooperate. There were probably no specific differences between the reasons for denouncement in the USSR or Nazi-Germany, though further research is necessary. Human nature showed itself at its basest or at its most naive in both states from time to time. Reasons for denouncing another person were seldom one-dimensional, but often a combination of circumstances, convictions and impulses. People could turn others in to the authorities for profit or promotion, out of fear, commitment to the regime or a combination of all these factors. The willingness to belong to the new state was a very powerful incentive for some denouncers. However, the denouncers were not the outcasts they were sometimes made out to be. In both totalitarian systems there were citizens from all walks of life who tried to use the states might to further their interests or satisfy their needs. And there were also a lot of citizens who cooperated with the regime out of habit. As mentioned before, the regime needed its citizen’s consent in carrying out its policies, and this consent could be as passive as just ignoring what was happening. To quote Richard Overy's grim remark: “Thousands of those victimized […] were isolated by their social group or their peers, not by the political police.”​[236]​  An important factor in understanding denunciations is acknowledging the fact that the denouncers were morally right according to the dominant political views of their day and age. The constant stream of propaganda altered the moral compass of many people. A lot of people simply wanted to belong and acted accordingly. Having the approval of the state to spy on others was a very strong incentive for many denunciations by ordinary citizens. 
As mentioned above, the Gestapo and the NKVD were somewhat similar in their organization, their objectives and their means, however they appear to have differed in aims. After all, the number of Jews was fixed; the number of 'enemies of the people' certainly was not. But both systems arrested and executed individuals on a comparable scale. The process of ‘cumulative radicalization’, in both countries made the security services ever more zealous in the hunting down and locking up of ‘enemies’. This was not only a characteristic aspect of the NKVD; in the case of Jews and other “racial threats” the Gestapo was equally ferocious. However, in the USSR anyone could be unmasked as an enemy, while the Gestapo tended more to acquitting German civilians from minor misdemeanors, yet persecuting and punishing Jews and other Rassenfeinde mercilessly. 
The NKVD-officers had to work under a lot of pressure since they themselves could be the next victims. Especially those higher up were vulnerable to political fluctuations; when their boss lost Stalin’s trust, they were bound to fall with him. Their only chance to avoid the ‘meat grinder’ was at every moment show their complete commitment to the Vohzd by following every order without question. Gestapo-officials lived and worked under considerably less stress; some of them were allowed to continue their work even if they were known to be unenthusiastic about Nazism. A loss of ideological zeal like that was all but unthinkable in the NKVD. Gestapo personnel on the whole were also better educated than NKVD-men.
So in conclusion one could state that the Gestapo had greater autonomy, more specialized personnel and was less inclined to arrest as many people as possible in comparison to the NKVD. Gestapo-officers were not under the threat of their own organization as were their NKVD-counterparts. Therefore we could say that in order to create and sustain a totalitarian regime it is not necessary per se to terrorize the political police force itself. We could also conclude that political police-officers did not need to be educated civil servants; remorseless thugs could also do the regimes bidding. What was necessary for a totalitarian states police apparatus was a large network of actively or passively cooperating citizens. The reactive nature of both organizations clearly shows that the regimes could not have functioned without consent. A schematic expression of the comparison can be seen in Table 4.
	Gestapo	NKVD
Size of organization	Small	Rather small
Personnel	Mostly educated, middle class civil servants.	Largely uneducated operator level executives.
Level of autonomy	High.	Low.
Investigations	Mostly reactive.	Mostly reactive.
Dependence on denouncers/informers	Very high.	Very high.
Number of denouncers/informers	Considerable.	High.
Involvement in large security operations	Considerable.	High.
Level of public participation in law-enforcement	High.	High.
‘Cumulative radicalization’	Yes. From 1938 to the end of the war. 	Yes. Predominantly during 1936-1938.
Impact on general society	Great.	Great.
Table 4: Schematic comparison between the Gestapo and the NKVD
The differences in character of the NKVD and the Gestapo are reflected in the victims they made. In Stalin's Russia an enormous amount of people were arrested and put in labor camps for something they had allegedly done. Almost every arrest meant tragedy for the direct family of the victim, who would be exiled, disowned or arrested themselves. However, most of those arrested survived. In Nazi-Germany, certain ethnic groups, like Jews and Gypsies, were hunted down for what they were. The chance of these people to survive was very slim, since they were not punished for a crime or “reformed”, but simply exterminated. 
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